Turkey and France: A Comparative Study of Administration and Politics

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Abstract

The article is a comparative analysis and exposition of the two *similar* cases of public bureaucratic development of France and Turkey having different political characteristics. It is indeed these political differences that enable us to make comparison. The article also tries to establish a theoretical framework for a scientific method of comparison by referring critically to the main theoretical suggestions introduced by F. Heady's focus on bureaucracy and Riggs' *Sala* model. The conclusion, however, refers to the characteristic aspects of the state power and political power, which are established in a *different* manner in the two *similar* cases of development.

Key words: bureaucracy, public administration, rationality, politics, state, government, development, Sala, patrimonialism, pendulum system

Introduction

The present article examines the main issues of development of the public administration and bureaucracy in Turkey and France. On the one hand, the fact that both country have many common points in terms of political and administrative history, state tradition, centralism of the state organization, religious question, and on the other hand, that the current situation as regards the initial aims in the attempts of bureaucratic change in both countries were rather different, have been the first impulse to make such a study of comparison.

During the study, at large degree, I will prefer to depend on the selective summaries of the main books about the subject since for now there seems no alternative to examine two "distinctively similar" cases of development.

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French Experience

Formation of modern bureaucratic forms of France goes back to the events of 1789 Revolution and afterwards. Within about 200 hundred years since, the country has lived different sorts of political regimes. The revolution attacked the monarchy, aristocracy, the Catholic Church in favor of a republican sort of government and put it in motion for the ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity. However, old system was not completely destroyed. The defenders of the past were "able to revive the monarchy in the nineteenth century and to delay for decades any definitive regulation of the church's powers" (Blondel & Godfrey 1968: 3).

Clerical question is "not only a main source of political conflict in France but is also the only generally accepted concrete referent of the major symbols of political conflict in France". The question politically originates from the historical, philosophical and even psychological reasons. The Revolution of 1789 identified itself with the overthrown of the old regime but also it ended some of the privileges of the Church which was closely associated with that regime (Pierce, 1973; 16)[2]. As regards the socialization of youth, the question is expressed in the duration (Pierce 1973: 17). Church symbolized authority. But, it is interesting that Republicans thought that the institution of the church had to be subordinated to "properly elected assembly" (Pierce 1973: 18).

Immediately after revolution, 1792 is the date of first proclamation of French Republic. The first republic lives till 1799 when Napoleon Bonaparte proclaims himself as the first Council and in 1804 the first emperor of France. Before him, between 1793 and 1794, Jacobin Dictatorship had been established. It used the state as an instrument for a radical social change. In 1814-15, we see that counter-revolutionaries came to power and restored the monarchy in a liberal mood. But the parliamentary monarchy of the Legitimists ended by the 1830 Charter and was replaced by Orleans's monarchy. 1848 Revolution meant the demise of monarchical tradition and brought the republican form into the agenda. Nevertheless, it would be replaced with the Second Empire of Lois Napoleon, nephew of Bonaparte. This second empire led into the tragic events of 1871 Commune and afterwards gave its place to the Third Republic of France. This would be the last longing republican period till the Vichy Regime of the Second World War. After the war, the fourth republic was established in 1945 but only to be changed by the fifth one in 1958. The republic of our times is the fifth republic.

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[2] The issue also affects the social patterns and recruitment criteria in the public and private enterprises. It is argued as an observation that "there are two distinctive recruitment patterns for white-color workers in state and private enterprise: the civil service recruits in the anti-clerical southwest and central regions, while Parisian business recruits workers for similar jobs in the more strongly Catholic north, west and, and east" (Pierce, 1973; 19).

Political history of France after the 1789 Revolution puts the question of political leadership and stability questions for the rules of political succession and decision making in the state (Silberman 1993: 89-90). These questions lead into the formation of an "internal labor market" for bureaucracy (Silberman 1993: 92), which in fact directs all entry to and leaving from bureaucracy, the rules of the internal movements within the organization, position and prestige of the civil servants. Furthermore, new public bureaucracy implied a new sense of community on the base of civil equality and the question of political equality based upon the demands of the Revolution (Silberman 1993: 89-119).

Besides this ever-changing character of political regime, there is also a constitutional discontinuity in a way that a change in the regime brings its own constitution, yet to be replaced by that of subsequent regime. In the face of this revolutionary, counter-revolutionary political tradition, French political history has certain pillar points, however:

> "the most curious intermixture of political strands following the Revolution was the imperial tradition into which Napoleon Bonaparte (1799-1814) stumbled, which his nephew perfected in the Second Empire (1852-1870) and which some modern commentators feel is being reincarnated in the fifth republic of General De Gaulle" (Blondel & Godfrey 1968: 5)[3].

Under Napoleon,

> "France was given a well-functioning administration, codes of law, and a theory of the administrative process which were to be the envy of many countries for several generations. Not only is much of the State machinery created by Napoleon I still in existence of France, but as under the Emperor, much of it remains outside the political arena. Since the last imperial period ended in 1870, many political battles have been bought, but they have largely been fought over governments and their policies, not over the administrative instruments of the governments" (Blondel & Godfrey 1968: 6).

There emerged under Napoleon a *Bonapartist* state, attributed to his name and which continued up to day. Silberman states that

> "the institutionalization of the French state bureaucracy had been largely achieved by 1890. Before the end of the nineteenth century, the French upper-level civil service had acquired all of the basic characteristics of the rational-legal organization described by Weber (1993: 156)[4].

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[3] And the most interesting point, "The Napoleon cleverly exploited Rousseau's theory of the general will, which in earlier days had been one of the cries of the revolutionary assemblies" (Blondel & Godfrey 1968: 5).
"The apparatus of the State which Napoleon I devised became a large and often arbitrary instrument, which operated as a force of its own, deriving its powers from the personal strength of the Emperor, not from the French people as such"(Blondel and Godfrey, 1968; 6)
"the Second Empire...was the period when France experienced her first and greatest industrial boom and really moved at last from a predominantly agricultural economy to that of a modern and developed society" (Blondel & Godfrey 1968: 6).
[4] It had there not by any immutable development of industrial society. The major underpinnings of the system had been created by the first Napoleon when France had only the glimmerings of an industrial

The republican and bureaucratic tradition is the main characteristics of French politics in spite of different sort of ideas, fights and struggles in motion[5].

The most observable quality in French politics and administration is centralism. It is witnessed that "divisions run deep in France", and that "fragmentation of basic social attitudes", and "ideological and political sectionalism of the country" originates from the earlier times than the revolution of 1789 (Blondel & Godfrey 1968: 23)[6].

> "the very number and complexity of the social division accounts for state centralization, both administrative and cultural. If the French Kings, and later the Empire, had not given the country a strong and united administrative, it would probably not have survived. If the Republic had not attempted to give the country a uniform political culture running geographical and social barriers, the Republic would probably not have survived. Administrative centralization was practiced by all regimes" (Blondel & Godfrey 1968: 24).

It is argued that nineteenth and early twentieth century centralization was accepted by all regimes as a reason of survival of the State. But, the more important is the result of the necessity, which gives to France "one of the best and most modern forms of State planning and one of the most enlightened higher civil service structure in the world". It is claimed that this is an accidental result "though 'enlightened despotism' characterized the French State for centuries" (Blondel & Godfrey 1968: 24-5).

The other distinctive characteristic of French centralism comes from the Republican contribution, mainly since 1880s, to the "new political culture". This could provide through a "centralized education system", which is a creation of the centralized structure of the state, in fact. The education structure creates a "political culture" for Frenchmen to be "liberal, lay, egalitarian", but, "it was not to be

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revolution. The structure which emerged out of the agonizing pendulum swings of the nineteenth century was created by political choices of political leaders who sought without success for the most of the century, to reduce the uncertainty about political leadership and its capacity to stay in power" (1993; 156).

[5] "The forth republic was in many ways a streamlined version of the Third, emphasizing the purest republican tradition of a powerful, sovereign, popular assembly, e weak executive, and an administrative apparatus which floated in an ambiguous limbo below the government. One degree remote from democratic responsibility, the bureaucratic administration did not only have permanency, however; it was to be the most powerful machine of change in modern French society;...it was to use all the techniques at its disposal to give strength and energy to the new forces, gradually diminish the opposition of the tradition corps, and give to France, after little more than a decade, one of the most flourishing economic systems of the world. While the premiers and their cabinet were becoming targets of wide criticism turned to disgust, the administration saw its (Blondel & Godfrey 1968: 9) influence increase. The end of the forth republic coincided with the coming of age of a curious mixture of technocracy and democracy within the bureaucratic machinery itself" (Blondel & Godfrey 1968: 10).

[6] "There are opposition between town and country, employer and worker, the provinces and Paris, Church and anti-Church" (Blondel & Godfrey 1968: 23).

imported in a totalitarian fashion" (Blondel & Godfrey 1968: 25). This is consistent with the seemingly paradox:" The Republican ideology undermined the tradition of authority on which all state, even republican ones, have to be based; only the centralized administration could enable the State to maintain itself" (Blondel & Godfrey 1968; 26).

Centralized state of France, if it can be simply explained, is caused partly by the fact that political regimes were not structured to give permission to the decentralization measures and partly by the fact that "enlightened despotism" deeply affected the country. In seventeenth century, mainly by Colbert, who was the King's minister, certain type of "plans of development" is devised for the various sectors in the economy. Napoleon I restructured later on administrative institutions to ensure a strong central directives and his officials implemented large scale projects for public works. In this period, the State concentrates all sort of political, economic and social activities within its body (Blondel & Godfrey 1968: 116).

The years between Napoleon I and De Gaulle, the state organization has not been changed despite the changing nature of political regimes and constitutions. The *Department*, the *canton*, and the *commune* have still been the main territorial units since the Revolution of 1789 created the territorial units of the state by destroying the provincial ones of the *Ancient Regime*. Only during the fifth republic, *arrondissement*, which located between the departments and cantons were abolished since they were ineffectively small units. The significant change is made for Paris metropolitan area in 1964 (Blondel & Godfrey 1968: 116). Similarly, with the continuity in the administrative structure, "the hierarchical arrangements and the role fulfilled by some highly trained and highly prestigious corps of civil servants remained broadly based on the Napoleonic model". The *Ecole Polytechnique* is still the main channel for the highly trained technique in personnel recruitment to the higher services both in public and private enterprises. Some important changes occurred for the local governments and judiciary during the Third Republic. The commune was rendered a real local administration having an elected mayor and council, which performs many functions previously fulfilled by the central government. And, the *Counceil d'Etad* was transformed from an advisory organ of the Government to an administrative court (Blondel & Godfrey 1968: 117).

The other changes made during the Fifth Republic are "mostly technical and pragmatic without affecting the spirit and principles of administration". The significant change is related with the creation of new and multifunctional bodies at the middle level between central government and the department; that is the regional bodies for the economic purposes (Blondel & Godfrey 1968: 118).

As for the central agents of the administration, the distinctive characteristics can be observed as follows: "competence and prestige", skill and high training, "dedication and enthusiasm for the job" and accordingly "preparation in specialized schools of the civil service" (Blondel & Godfrey 1968: 118). The government has "numerous

'external services' " in the local areas from road building to the economic coordination and preparation and application of plans. A government network of schools and higher education are the main ground of prestige and competence for the future managers and administrators (Blondel & Godfrey 1968: 119). The grand corps, small bureaucratic elite group, is originated from two main "*grandes ecoles*"; The National School of Administration and the *Ecole Polytechnique*. The Council of the State, the Court of Accounts, the *Inspectorate of Finance* and the *Prefectoral Corps* are stuffed mainly through the channel of *grandes ecoles*. The *Polytechnique* provides the state with high level engineer administrators. This technical corp is divided in itself into the other corps such as the *Corps of Mines* and the *Corps of Roads and Bridges*. It is observed that private sector is other alternative for the experienced civil servants graduated from the *grandes ecoles* (Blondel & Godfrey 1968: 119-121).

The mutual relations between public and private sector make the public service not only far more sensitive towards the country and the business world but also make France "the perfect type of administrative State-with all the results, positive and negative" (Blondel & Godfrey 1968: 121-2). External relations of public bureaucracy make itself more accountable in an age of State intervention (Blondel & Godfrey 1968: 122) though this does not mean a substitution for "a democratic check". The fifth Republic starts a debate over the technocratic power. Officials became more independent from parliamentary members and more and more decided national economic and social affairs. The governmental system began to substitute this autonomy for the democratic discussions. Public enterprises which are "semi-autonomous" become the independent power centers. But anonymy of the civil servants was decreasing and their policies were known and discussed. But, it is suggested that

> "techniques must be used, if control is to be effective; the French political system has still to find the means by which a responsible government can be both readily maintained in power and effectively scrutinized, for its part, however, the French administration does provide the country with a system of responsible administration which adapted to the needs of the twentieth century" (Blondel & Godfrey 1968: 122).

In French political history, there is not only "institutional instability" (Pierce 1973: 28), but also "ministerial instability" (Pierce 1973: 21-6). It is observed that between 1879 and 1940 France was governed by 94 successions of governments having an average life of eight months (Pierce 1973: 21). This sort of instability in the execution probably brought into the agenda a parallel centralism of political power in the form of presidential government along the lines of administrative tradition of centralism during the time of de Gaulle (*see* Macridis 1975).

Turkish Experience

Ottoman Patrimonialism: In the case of Ottoman system, patrimonialism was "a tool for the personal rule of the leader" (Heper 1977: 36) and expressed itself in

such a way: absence of legal personality in Islamic law (şeriat); personal legal forms; bureaucratic personnel is the personal staff of the superior; administrative processes are not defined in terms of legal processes; up and down relations is realized in the form of patron-client-relationship; irregular Salaries; main aim of state administration schools is to secure the obedience to the Sultan (Heper 1977: 60-3).

Patrimonial bureaucracy, to Mardin, is good "schema" to demonstrate the social characteristics of Ottoman Empire and not only a form of bureaucracy but also a type of community and an example of a wide social organization (Mardin 1990: 178) Thanks to this form of organization, Ottoman Empire put an end to the uncertain and slippery social and political structure of the Middle East (Mardin 1990: 179)[7].

To sum, patrimonial bureaucratic organization of the society and the state seems that politico-administrative center dominates the peripheral elements of the system. Even so, Mardin uses his own center - periphery schema in understanding all political development of Ottoman-Turk history[8].

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[7] The characteristics of patrimonial rule are as follows:
1) Monarch represents the legitimacy,
2) Authority is executed through a "patrimonial bureaucracy" that is personally dependent on monarch, rather than through a dispersed aristocratic class,
3) Sovereignty of monarch is indivisible,
4) Center controls strategic areas of country through its bureaucracy,
5) Communities are controlled,
6) Social aggregations and movements are constantly organized and given an "order" and attributed a role, community leaders are put under the responsibility,
7) Qualities of subjects and economic resources are counted,
8) Since the central bureaucracy is small, decentralism is a part of state policy to get support of the power of periphery,
9) Each potential attack to the state is tried to be prevented,
10) Clerical system (ilmiye) depends on the state resources and hence it is different from the western church which has own hierarchy, resources and property,
11) Possible opposition of clergy does not lead in to a sort of church-state confrontation as in the west
12) State controls and supervises and even depress if necessary Islamic beliefs,
13) Religion of the State, (Din ü Devlet) is the seeming logic of the bureaucratic control of the state and society, survival reason of the religion is founded upon the continuity of the state,
14) State does not always succeed to provide a general order and consequently a fear from anarchy and collapse emerge (Mardin 1990: 179-80).
[8] For example, a large part of his article "*A Key to Explain Turkish Politics: Center-Periphery Relations*" (Mardin 1990) is devoted to what he calls "*Modernization as Westernization of Bureaucrats*" (Mardin 1990). This definition of modernization is not so much inconsistent with historical reality; however, it demonstrates that, since the term "patrimonialism" is used for not only a bureaucratic form but also for a definition of whole social, economic and political system, "bureaucratic reading" of Turkish polity and society is actually a "liberal" ideological reading of Ottoman-Turk history. By doing so, every element in history is reduced to patrimonialism, which is a key, in fact, to explain everything. Every change is under the initiative and control of bureaucracy. It changes itself and hence society and politics-administration. What is left to society (civil society outside of the political society of bureaucratic and political elite) is just to follow, adapt or react. This is the dynamism created by center- periphery, backward-forward dichotomy.

Patrimonialism is put side by side with Tanzimat reform and a double bureaucratic structure is produced. Tanzimat bureaucracy thought itself as a representative of general will. Like France, the conception of "the state is me" is replaced by an understanding of general public authority. However, state philosophy was not still depended on popular sovereignty and the conception that state could change with and through the social interests and development. Continuation of the patrimonial tradition demonstrated itself in the personal administration. Mahmut the Second wanted to say last word and the period of Abdulhamit favored personal commitments above everything. In Tanzimat and later period, appointment and administrative career were contingent on the individual criteria and security considerations (Heper 1977: 64-7).

The Sultan-the Caliph's authority was assumed to originate from the divine authority. During the 17 and 18th centuries, though the Sultan seemed like a sort of despotic monarch, he devoted his authority to his Viziers (ministers of the time) and palace notables at the center and to the local military staff and the eşraf. He was a bit a little powerful than a feudal king. The end of the 18.th and the beginning of 19.th centuries demonstrated the increasing personal despotism of Sultans, Selim the Third and more importantly Mahmut the Second. However, rising personal despotism of the Mahmut the Second was caused by the reforms which had destroyed the intermediary restrictive power in favor of Sultan and new communication - transportation technology and new security force, gendarme. So, new personal despotism was no longer old Islamic autocracy of the previous ages. The personal authority was put an end only in short periods of parliamentary movements during 1876-78 and some years after Young Turk revolution (Lewis 1991: 366-7)[9].

During the classical period (14-16.centuries), the central cadres are formed by *devsirmes* through a collection of Christian children from the villages. These children are grown for the palace services. By doing so, a hereditary aristocracy is not permitted at the center. Places and positions of *devsirme*s are regularly rearranged at the periphery, local military servants; *timarli sipahi* operates the lands and support the Sultan's army in return. Landed property is avoided since in theory all property belongs to Sultan. Jurisdiction, justice, education and religious affairs are realized by *İlmiye* (organization of religious class, ulema) (Lewis 1991: 439).

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[9] Bernard Lewis mentions a French diplomat who compares The Sultan's dispersed authority among ulema, lawyers and other notables with French monarch who uses an unconditional authority over the state affairs. Indeed, Sultan was a despot in name. On the other hand, for the classical period, Lewis reminds comparisons of Niccolo Machiavelli between French King and Ottoman Sultan. The latter ruled by himself the country whereas the former was circled by the privileged aristocrats. But, between period of Renaissance to 18.century, situation turned to the reverse. In France feudal chefs became the servants of the palace and autonomous regions a part of the central administration and the king proclaimed himself "state is me!" (XIV Lois). On the other hand, Sultan became the massacre of his wives, head of harem and his slaves while palace was put under the control of feudal lords, provinces under princes and palace masters under the palace slavery (Lewis 1991: 437-9).

In the classical period, Ottoman Empire's cabinet was Divan-ı Hümayun. In *Divan*, *Kubbe Viziers*, that is, military, financial and accounting heads meet periodically in the Topkapı Palace. Each members of the Divan had own administrative structure, personnel and a hierarchy of authority. In the Köprülü's period, (17. century), Divan was replaced by the office of Grand Vizier as called Bab-ı Ali. Bab-ı Ali became the centre of government. Its sessions are not periodic and military, civil and religious authorities meet with the will of the Grand Vizier (Lewis 1991: 368).

Dissolution of the System: The legacy of the Ottoman decadence to the 19.century was an "oligarchy composed of military-civil-religious bureaucracy" (Heper, 1974; 59-60)[10]. Mahmut began to rule the periphery through his civil servants, *muhassıl*s in 1831 and he previously had destroyed the Janissary Corp in 1826. The former was an attack to the local notables and the later destructed the source of the religious bureaucracy. Administration of Foundations under the control of religious bureaucracy was transferred into civil one. The most royal bureaucracy to the Sultan was the civil ones. Sultan wanted them to perform the function of "policy-making" rather than fulfilling the mere works of administration. The civil bureaucracy, based upon rational criterions, was required to realize the "enlightened despotism" of Mahmut. This bureaucracy together with the companion of "a new military bureaucracy" that would be later on created would form the cadres to rescue the Empire from decline and develop rational policies. This duty mainly belonged to the civil bureaucracy and the military cadres were seen as the inferior to the former (Heper 1974: 60-1).

Tanzimat: Heper argues that in Ottoman-Turk system, political system dominates the social and economic system in the sense that elite sensitivity towards the change and accordingly the system transformation follows these steps: 1) initial formation,2) dissolution caused by the western effects, 3) that elites become sensitive towards dissolution and the changing nature of the west. The elites are "generally" bureaucrats and the pioneers of the change since there is no entrepreneurial class (Heper 1974: 23). The bureaucracy is affected by the "political norms" rather than administrative ones and seen as the pioneer of the modernization attempts which could be "reduced to secularization" in main.

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[10] After 16.century, because of degeneration of timar order, which was the basic military and economic unit, and because of increasing importance of the central army, the state began to sold its tax sources to the *mültezims* (tax collecters) in return of cash money. This system results in the emergence of new local propertied class. Other new economic powers at the local areas were *ayan* (old local merchants) and *derebeyi*, who was a sort of feudal lords over the Anatolia. In 1808, Ayans and derebeyis made Mahmut the Second sign a chart called *Sened-i İttifak*, by which he acknowledged their local authority. However, as Lewis observed (p 442; *footnote*), Mahmut was determined to liquidate his aristocratic class like King John in the time Magna Chart of 13.century England and he succeeded to destroy the local privileges thanks to the 19.century political resources (Lewis 1991: 442).

Accordingly, institutionalization pattern of bureaucratic organization develops within the framework of the "secular-Islamic dialectic" (Heper 1974: 20). The conscious attempts of transformation in Ottoman-Turk bureaucratic institutionalization demonstrate that the change is not "organic" but "induced" (Heper 1974: 22).

Tanzimat reforms and westernization process inserted legal-rational characteristics into old patrimonial bureaucracy. Financial and military concerns of the 19th Century required a civil bureaucracy who is to be professionalized in these state affairs (Heper, 1977; 82-3). However, legal rational development was started with Mahmut the Second's attacks towards religious logic of law making. Before Mahmut, law of will already had been executed apart from religious law. But, Mahmut created a possibility through which a completely independent law making processes from Şeriat could be codified and executed. Even so, the state could contradict with Şeriat. This development seriously attacked the patrimonial personality in the state affairs in favor of institutional relationships. State began to be recognized by its organs in the place of Sultan's existence; state servants became the representatives of the state in the place of Sultan's representatives (Heper 1977: 85-6). Several over-ministerial institutions such as *Dar- Şura-yı Bab-ı Ali*, *Meclis- i Vala-yı Ahkam-ı Adliye* were estblished for law making and codification activities (Heper 1977: 88). Sultan's bureaucracy created a belief that institutions were more important than persons (Heper 1977: 86).

During Tanzimat period, the function of policy making in the state was fulfilled by civil bureaucracy (Heper 1974: 58). Policy of the state was made through the "codification" rather than parliamentary tools. Supra-ministerial institutions functioned as legislative power. *Dar-ý Şura-yı Bab-ı Ali* and *Meclis-i Vala-Ahkam-ı Adliye* were the main institutions of this bureaucratic legislation. Their members are civil bureaucrat and they make the codification Mahmut the Second devised. The tradition of bureaucratic ruling, as called by Heper, began by these "rational and prestigious" cadres (Heper 1974: 59).

Real beginning of European ministerial system came into the agenda during Mahmut the Second's Tanzimat movement. The aim was to control strictly ulema class. But attempts cannot be said to be real westernization. Between 1936 and1938, new names were accepted but immediately old ones were used[11].

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[11] In 1839 Umur-u Nafia Nezareti was found for the economic affairs; in 1870 Zaptiye Nezareti, in 1836 Umur-u Dahiliye Nezareti. Seraskerlik was transformed to Harbiye Nezareti in the future. In 1857, Umur-u Maarif Nezareti and in 1879 Adliye Nezareti decreased the authority of ulema. Both primary education and judiciary with its new judges and courts were put under the secular control of the state (Lewis 1991: 369). These ministries are the body of the state. Later on Bahriye Nezareti, Ticaret ve Ziraat Nezareti, Posta ve Telgraf Nezareti and in 1971, İaşe Nezareti was found. Republican Government transferred all Ottoman ministries to Ankara and located them into different buildings. Foreign and internal affairs were divided. Ministry of Health and Social Help was established with the republic. In 1946, Ministry of Work was established (Lewis 1991: 370).

Attempts to give legal characteristic to bureaucracy were not new for Tanzimat reformers. Tracks of a similar sort of French "grands ecoles" traditions were seen in Mehmed the Conqueror during 15.century. However, the main aim in this education policy for bureaucracy was to create personnel commitment to Sultan. Question of education and training of bureaucracy came back into the agenda in Selim the Third's period at the last decades of 18th Century. The state sent young bureaucrats abroad for them to learn language and to gain professional knowledge with its diplomats to Vienna, London, and Paris, Berlin. In the period of Mahmut the Second, attempts were made to train administrative servants (Heper 1977: 91-2)[12]. Apart from this educational and training base of legal rational bureaucratic authority, new regulations were executed during the time of Mahmut and later on 1883. The merit system, appointments and promotions, positions and posts are in a certain degree eliminated from personal criterions and influences. In principle, state service began to be regularly salaried job. By this process, merit and authority system have both legal-rational and patrimonial characteristics side by side (Heper 1977: 95).

Decreasing significance of religious law in the state affairs resulted in legality in administration at least in a formalistic type (Heper, 1977; 87). After 1876, legal regulations were made for personnel regime, hierarchical organization of bureaucracy, discipline fairs, salaries, and commissions were formed for personnel appointments (Heper 1977:; 88).

During 19.century, the term *mülkiye* means the civil services apart from affairs and servises of military and religious organization, *ilmiye*. *Umur-u Dahiliye Nezareti*, found in 1836 by Mahmut the Second was called mülkiye at the beginning. Later on the term *dahiliye,* interior affairs, was to be used and in time *mülkiye* started to imply the services outside the military and finance. During 1833-46 years, new public positions are classified and new official names and titers are given to these positions rather than persons. But, new state offices suffered from the lack of personnel. The new secular schools founded by Mahmut were not enough. Even in 1872, Cevdet Pasha stated not only the shortage of personal in the state but also question of merit and curriculum of the *Mülkiye Mektebi*. He criticized the search of the job for men rather than the search of men for the existing jobs. The civil servant had to be paid regularly. Nevertheless, the old working and personnel system at large continued. A young man started to work thanks to his familial relations and was not paid until the acceptation to the position. The Salaries were low and irregular but the civil service had a much prestige and status in the eyes of people and the most secure job in the society. For this reason, civil services are

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[12] In 1833 *Tercüme Odası* (Translation Room), in 1838 *Mekteb-i Maarif-i Adliye*, in 1849 *Darül Maarif*, in 1852 *Mekteb-i Eklam* (later on in 1859 replaced by *Mekteb-i Fünun-u Mülkiye*), in 1867 Mekteb-i Sultani, in 1857 *Mekteb-i Osmani* (founded in Paris) are the main schools. *Mekteb-i Sultani* and *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (restructured in 1877) were the main schools for bureaucrats.

rendered more secure job through many legal arrangements. Security of memur became more important than his qualifications (Lewis 1991: 370-1).

The seeming characteristic of the new state elites was that they came from the rich families (Heper 1974: 68) and saw themselves the only ones capable of the state administration. This attitude makes them a closed group. They conceived themselves the servants of the state rather than that of the Sultan. They believed that the policy they created would be in favor of the public interest and perfectly represent the general will. Despite this arrogance, they did not trust towards the rank and file within bureaucracy and for this reason they did not devoted their power. Nevertheless, the merit of these bureaucratic seniors was their persistence for the institutions rather than individuals (Heper 1974; 69). The previous centuries saw the salvation of the state in the mercy of the competent Sultans (Heper 1974: 70).

The autonomy and political power of the new bureaucracy were derived from their merit in foreign language, practical knowledge and specialization in diplomacy and finance. In addition, foreign powers and the Sultans in the time supported these enlightened bureaucracy. Moreover, they operated the education structure, judiciary and security offices (Heper 1974: 67-8).

Abdulhamit's Period: As can be foreseen, rational, impersonal and despotic attitudes in the state administration of the Tanzimat bureaucracy resulted in both a liberal attack of Young Ottoman intelligentsia and the opposition of the religious strata in the country. In the face of these opposition and attacks, Abdulhamit came to power and immediately liquidated from the political arena the Tanzimat bureaucracy (Heper 1974: 71-3) and brought into a Islamic totalitarian system in the place of previous west oriented policies. As a result, religious bureaucracy was empowered (Heper 1974: 76). Another development was an emergence of new commercial class within the minorities, which allied to opportunist and corrupt wings of the civil bureaucracy. This new bourgeoisie had no intention to transform the Ottoman economic and political system (Heper 1974: 97).

Abdulhamit established an agency of secret affairs to control and suppress the civil and military bureaucracy and tried to prevent the penetration of the western ideas into the country. Nevertheless, he had to depend upon the competent bureaucracy in the state affairs. The bureaucracy was still influential both in opposition and other political activities. They are affected by the ideas originated from French Revolution of 1789. Only these ideas could cure for the problems of the country. However, as Heper observes, these ideas had been developed mainly for the interests of an economically powerful entrepreneurial class who was outside the political power in France (Heper, 1974; 78-80).

During time of Abdulhamit (1876-1908), new, educated elite had already emerged. With the rise of this stratum, old community structure of the Ottoman elites was broken down and power struggle increased. Imperial administrative elite was no more recruited from the close familial influences. Among them, *subay*s (military

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educated staff), *memur*s (members of civil administration and also in the meaning of "one to be *ordered* and *directed*"), *journalists* and *lawyers* are the most significant groups. This group prepares the foundation of new Turkey. New secular schools of Abdulhamit, new courts and new secular legal texts increased the importance of lawyers (Lewis 1991: 455). A public emerged for the new media. During the last quarter of the 19.century literacy increased three once. However, as Lewis states, the role played by journalists and lawyers depended upon the *subay*s and memur influence (Lewis 1991: 456).

Mardin observes that the Abdulhamit period witness a development in the state functions and political differentiation and in this sense, continue the modernization process started by Tanzimat. The period represented a transition from what Max Weber calls "patrimonial bureaucracy" to "rational" bureaucracy. The administrative system began to be professional and to be erected upon "legality" (Mardin 1990: 215), which implied a development of impersonality in the administrative affairs and professional division of labor in the form of ministries and other sub-offices in the state. Mardin said that this Weberian legal rationality had been inserted into the state system during the Tanzimat and mainly into the military institutions. However, such a development began to contradict with the personal administration of the Abdulhamit period (Mardin 1990: 216-7). Nonetheless, the period at large degree completed the modernization process of the military education and training. The students in the military schools learn modern, rational legal categories; merit, law, education, professionalism. The more significant one is that recruitment base to entry to military was widened into the lower strata of the society (Mardin 1990: 217-8). But, Abdulhamit's period put all rational development into a conflict with patrimonial categories (Mardin 1990: 219). Graduates of the military schools have some common beliefs and attitudes such as "heroism", "patriotism", altruism, et cetera and form an "esprit de corps" (Mardin 1990: 220)[13].

The continuation of the bureaucratic influence of the Tanzimat was caused also by the fact that Abdulhamit did not stop the development of the secular education since the country was in danger. Although many bureaucrats graduated from *Mülkiye* were used instrumentally by Abdulhamit's politics, this school was still the main spring of new ideas and the bureaucratic attitudes such as careerism (Heper 1974: 79-80)[14].

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[13] Mustafa Kemal was a good representative of the generation with critical attitudes towards the double faces of the period of Abdulhamit (Mardin 1990: 215). However, what distinguished Mustafa Kemal from the many member of his generation is that he could recognize the rational qualities of the western administration within the whole of western civilization. Western administration was a part of the cultural whole of the Europe (Mardin 1990: 221-2).

[14] It is also very paradoxical that in this conservative period, "scientific realism" in a "normative, theoretical, utopian and scholastic" manner was absorbed by the intellectuals and replaced the partial, imitative and unsystematic modernization of the Tanzimat (Heper 1974: 81).

In both the last years of Abdulhamit and new Young Turk period, military bureaucracy was the pioneer for the secularization policy since the military schools developed in size and quality far more than those of the civil bureaucracy and because the country faced serious foreign attacks for decades. For civil bureaucracy, only *Mülkiye* had a university status whereas for the military, *Harbiye* (the school of military affairs), *Bahriye* (the school for Naval) and *Topçu* (the school of artillery) and *Mühendishane* (the school of military engineering). All these military schools injected western ideas into the students (Heper 1974: 84).

Reaction to Abdulhamit and the Young Turk Period: The law, judiciary organization, ministries and administrative units of the nineteenth century predominantly was originated from French models and had been adapted to the government with small changes after Sultan's decrees and wills. The first constitution, 1876 Kanun-u Esasi was adapted from Belgium's 1831 constitution, where parliament was located above the elected local councils and communes. The constitution is postponed when Abdulhamit closed the parliament in 1878 and 1908 Young Turk Revolution put an end Abdulhamit period and started second constitutional era with parliament. The dominant party, *İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası* empowered the parliament to avoid the Sultan's and his prime minister's influences in the palace (Lewis 1991: 359-60)[15].

Young Turk Period (1909-1919) substituted the pan-Turkism and westernization for the pan-Islamism and Islamic totalitarianism. The progress they envisaged could be possible only with education. The secular political formulas of the west had to be inserted into military and civil bureaucracy. Heper states that the origin of the Kemalist reforms goes back to this period. For example, *İttihat ve Terakki* attempted to end the dual legal structure coming from the Tanzimat. Religious courts were connected to the ministry of justice, primary education was taken out of the control of the highest religious authority, *Şeyhülislamlık* and marriage was made a legal act. Furthermore, the bible, *Koran*, was translated from Arabic into Turkish. Nevertheless, *İttihat ve Terakki* could not prevent the *Şeyhülislam* (minister of divinity) to participate in the cabinet and hence his authority of veto over the law making process could not be limited (Heper 1974: 82-3).

19. Century devotes its energy to create a modern military and a modern state on which the military is founded. For this reason, development of military and civil bureaucracy was faster than the development of ulema, religious bureaucracy. These civil and military elite were aware of the reason behind the collapse of empire and the superiority of West and were rather patriotic. This civil and military class

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[15] However, the executive lost its relative power before the parliament. *İttihat ve Terakki*, during the Balkan and World Wars, put the Sultan in a higher position above parliament. Indeed, in 1918, Sultan Mehmed the Sixth closed the parliament and began to govern through his prime minister. In 1919, the last elections were made in the country and the parliament was closed by Sultan unconditionally in 11 April 1920 shortly after its own declaration.

recognized its own responsibility, mission and privileges. This belief also was shared by the people in the form of status and authority. In the opening session of The Grand National Assembly in 1920, two-third of the members was coming from civil (138), military (53) and religious bureaucracy (53) (Lewis 1991: 456).

The military bureaucracy took the pioneering role in the transformation of the state and immediately liquidated the sections of the bureaucrats who had a close relation with the Palace, and incompetent and conservative ones. Nevertheless, new economic policy of *İttihat ve Terakki* and other liberal and structural reforms needed a civil bureaucracy (quoted in Heper 1974: 85). In addition many bureaucrats of the Abdulhamit period were the allies of the military. Since in the Abdulhamit's period, they had either not found a career prospect or been new graduates of the *Mülkiye*, they supported *İttihat ve Terakki*. For this reason, they actively participated in political life in new period. However, the post-war government liquidated these features from their posts (Heper 1974: 86).

The importance of the military bureaucracy also comes from the incapacity of the civil ones to prevent the imperial decadence and the war conditions after 1911. In addition German military tradition was influential for a generation in the form of military advisory of Germans and privileges given to the German state (Heper 1974: 84-5).

Political activities of servants are prohibited by a law enacted in 1912 though party politics are rather weak. During the 19th Century and before Republican era, rank and file of bureaucracy was seen as an agent of the continuity of political power and hence strictly put under the control. Representatives of the central state had a majority in the 19.century local councils, which did not already any executive power. Bureaucracy was rendered sensible to the center, not to "periphery". There was no devolution of power and very limited rationality within bureaucracy. Influence of the Sultan's palace to bureaucracy was also prevented (Heper 1977: 88-90).

Before Republican era, higher echelons of the bureaucracy demonstrated political elite characteristics and the rank and file had no any autonomy. Reformation attempts produced some limited rational qualities and higher echelons obtained "substantial rationality" rather than "instrumental rationality". The latter sort of rationality is what Weber's theory of modern bureaucratic authority had to have. For this reason, Heper calls stage of development in this time of Ottoman Turk bureaucratic institutionalization "legal-patrimonialism" (Heper 1977: 90-1).

Early Republican Era: The new parliament opens in 23 April 1920 in Ankara[16]. Intentions for a new constitution were productive and resulted in *Teşkilatı Esasiye*

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[16] Mustafa Kemal became the head of the *Grand National Assembly* and his secondary head was Celalettin Arif who had been the last head of the Ottoman parliament, *Meclis-i Mebusan* in Istanbul. One day before the opening session of the Assembly, Mustafa Kemal had announced to the military

Kanunu, which was the first Constitution of new Turkey. Its significance comes from the concepts it circulated: popular sovereignty, execution of sovereignty by people, Turkish State. These all were a radical rupture from the old Islamic empire to the secular national state. The rupture would be consolidated by the proclamation of Republic in 29 December 1923 and 1924 Constitution of the new state. This constitution will be in force till the 1961 Constitution. The more important, Bernard Lewis argued that republican system lasted without confronting serious attacks (Lewis 1991: 365-6).

In 1924 when the first controlled democracy trying through *Terakkiperver Fırka*, military nominees to the parliamentary are wanted to resign from the military service and at the same year the head of the general staff is persuaded for leaving from the cabinet. This implied a division between military affairs and political activity. In fact, this division was based on the experience of period of the *İttihat ve Terakki* when the army intervened into the civil bureaucracy. Such an inference was seen as one of the reasons of the military defeat and the corruption of the bureaucracy. Heper interprets this development as a mark of the power of the civil bureaucracy even though the Republican Populist Party at the outset was founded on the military ground (Heper 1974: 113).

Lewis observed that economic factors and forces can hardly be distinguished in early phase of the revolutionary struggle. Power struggle occurred between the groups and factions of the ruling elite. Legacy of the Young Turk period was to widen foundation of political interests and participation. Members of the military were no longer restricted with the certain rich families. Modernization of the military during the 19.centurty, many coming from the sub-strata of the society gave a chance to move towards higher statuses. Young Turk period also demonstrated an involvement of the army into politics and hence politics went outside the narrow framework of *Bab-ı Ali* and palace. Elections (after first constitutional monarchy in 1876), rising literacy and press, political activities on the popular base created new political attitudes and thoughts. Military interest in politics also originated from the times of guerrilla movements in Trace and

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and provincial units that new governmental center of the nation and the state was the new assembly. The assembly elected its execution, *İcra Vekilleri Heyeti* (Lewis 1991: 362-3).

The composition of assembly members was predominantly the civil servants, memur-bureaucrat and military members; that is, 125 civil servant, 13 municipal servant, 53 military member (10 in higher ranks, pasha), 50 religious servant (14 in higher ranks), 120 merchant, farmer and professional (40 commerce, 32 farmer, 20 lawyer, 1 journalist, 2 engineer, 1 artisan). At least 92 members came from the Ottoman parliament, *Meclis-i Mebusan*. It can be observed that many members of the assembly believed that the new parliament was temporal and its mission would last till the rescue of the Sultan in Istanbul. Accordingly a new constitution was not necessary for many. But, Mustafa Kemal from the beginning thought that the new parliament should be a Conventional, Constitutional Assembly (Lewis 1991: 363). In addition, Sultan's government in İstanbul and residual military power in Anatolia reacted to new power in Ankara. Paradoxically these internal and external reactions increased the personal position of Mustafa Kemal (363-4).

preparation for resistance in Anatolia after the collapse of the first war. In sum, military learnt the direct action in politics (Lewis 1991: 457).

Political Elite: The early republican political elite were a small group who believed in the principles of nationalism, popularism and in lesser degree in political democracy (Heper 1974: 96). A new civil bureaucracy would develop on the ground of these principles.

Close circle of Atatürk was composed of the members of *İttihat ve Terakki* who came to the higher echelons of the military bureaucracy after the liquidation of the bureaucracy leaning to Abdulhamit and the politicians of the Young Turk period. The latter group came to Ankara after the occupation of İstanbul. The new political elite obtained support of the local notables and merchants till the 1930s. The support of the commercial class of the minorities could not be foreseen. A large political support was not available for Atatürk and his close friends. The masses, on the other hand, were seen not to be affected by the century old modernization process. The existing support to the elite meant not a true belief towards the new political thoughts. In Anatolia, there was in fact no "nation" (quoted in Heper 1974: 98). Furthermore, new cleavages among the nationalist elite would emerge after the salvation war (Heper 1974: 96-8). Internal opposition as such came from the liberal and conservative supporters of Sultanate. They formed a parliamentary group in the first legislative assembly but later on were liquidated through nomination and election process from the assembly (Heper 1974: 99).

The strategy chosen by the political elite was to create a secular and rational elite and then to transform the masses (Heper 1974: 99). Atatürk overlooked the intellectual capabilities of the cabinet and assembly members. That the cabinet members were" the elite within the elite" also resulted in the domination of the execution in the political life and the continuation of the bureaucratic tradition (Heper 1974; 100). This tendency was also caused by the fact that Atatürk looked down the Ottoman bureaucracy and the fact that bureaucracy of Istanbul could not fuse into the Anatolian movement and furthermore by the fact that civil bureaucracy demonstrated a far more loyalty to Sultan the military bureaucracy (Heper 1974: 101). Such kind of background made the civil bureaucracy an inferior of the military from the outset and put it under the control of the latter. Military bureaucracy was used also for the elimination of the prefectures and sub-prefectures leaning to Istanbul. After the complete control had been ensured over civil bureaucracy, Ottoman civil servants were put out from the office. New cadres loyal to Ankara were required also for the local notables and riches to support the government. Indeed, in the early republican period, civil bureaucracy exposed a dual character and the nationalists often confronted the *Babı-Ali* wing in their reformation attempts (quoted in Heper 1974: 102-3). The lack of civil bureaucracy competent and suitable for the westernization reforms required a formation of new bureaucratic cadres. The military and party bureaucracies were not good at this strategic purpose (Heper 1974: 104).

Mülkiye and *Harbiye* were transferred from İstanbul to Ankara in 1937. İstanbul University which was restructured in the university reform in 1933 was not seen available for the new strategic purposes of the regime[17]. During İnönü' government and presidency, revolutionary tradition acquired a bureaucratic quality. Despite the weakening of the early revolutionary enthusiasm and the demise of the charismatic authority of Atatürk, which would be replaced by bureaucracy in İnönü period, İnönü stamped his personality, which was far "more bureaucrat than being a statesman", over the state administration. It was also observed that Atatürk in his last years disagreed with İnönü in the bureaucratic attitude in the state affairs (Heper 1974: 108-9).

Secularism and Popularizm[18]: With republic, political elite, Heper claimed, accepted both secularism and "political democracy" and make administrators accept these principles. As a way of application of principles of secularism, traditional religious bureaucracy was repressed and its civil functions were transferred to civil bureaucracy as Sultanate and Caliphate were eliminated. All legal services, teachers and religious servants are made civil servants[19].

The Party and Government: The principle of popularizm implied a social solidarity and a new sense of community in which no classes and no class interest existed but only the groups which were assumed to not confront among themselves. By this, it was rejected that different interests in the society could be represented in the state in different form. The principle, in fact, supported the bureaucratic state tradition. As Heper defines, this meant that the government was "for the people but not

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[17] *The School of Law* that had been established in Ankara together with *Mülkiye* became the main sources of the new civil bureaucracy. The graduates of these schools were Kemalist revolutionary oriented (Heper 1974: 105-6). The prime ministers of the time, İsmet İnönü and Recep Peker presented the principles of the Kemalism and anti-liberal ideas of the time in these universities. Both the higher education and the high schools were inspired from the French models. The contents of curriculum were theoretical, normative and intellectual (Heper 1974: 107). Nevertheless, as quoted in Heper, political aims prevented an emergence of a creative and empirical tradition in the new high schools. This normativism would probably be the reason of the emerging static and ideological attitudes of the bureaucratic elite after 1930s in a way that main purpose meant to preserve the modern institutions as what they were.

[18] The term can be replaced by "populism" as well. However the latter has other connotations.

[19] Later on, principle of secularism was put among the six principles of Kemalism after the amendment in the constitution for the elimination of the statement of state religion as Islam (Heper, 1977; 96). In fact, sixth principles of Kemalism (of the state and Republican Populist Party) replaced the all religious principles. The political implementation of the six principles needed a secularist bureaucratic cadre that was required to commit to the goals of new regime. New training schools would create these bureaucratic personnel apart from the development of new legal frameworks (Heper 1977: 97). This formalistic legality of the Mustafa Kemal's was empowered during the time of İnönü in the form of bureaucratic state (Heper 1977: 98).

Mustafa Kemal in the early phase of Anatolian movement claimed in a speech that new order was in *sui generis* quality, which signaled the principle of popularizm for the new regime. It was neither imperialist, nor capitalist, or democratic and socialist (Lewis 1991: 458-9). In 1923 of İzmir Congress of Economy, he rejected class struggle and at this base proclaimed national economy policy (Lewis 1991: 461) and 1925 *Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu* banded syndicating and socialist activities (Lewis 1991: 463). This policy already avoided politics to be founded upon economic interests and closed the politics to the political and administrative elites, in fact.

through the people" (1974; 94). Nonetheless, liberal attitudes were not given up all together. Indeed, as Heper observes, Atatürk saw the autocracy and the one-party government only as "a burden"[20].

The Party bureaucracy was also a powerful instrument in such a manner that all bureaucratic appointments from the head of the village council to the higher echelons began to be made after the initial consent of the party according to the party congress. The party organization was so effective that it could easily supervise and at could easily replace the civil bureaucracy. The party emerged as a parallel organization to the bureaucracy and, moreover, as quoted in Heper, it became a part of the government in the education and executive affairs[21].

Estatism: The cadres who had governed the *War of Liberation* (1918-22) directly participated into the political strategy making process after "independence". In the later period, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (The Republican People's Party) would fulfill this function. Only after 1930s, civil bureaucracy could be ready for the process of modernization since during the salvation war civil bureaucracy under the influence of "the new traditionalism" of the Istanbul governments had not been prepared for the strategic purposes of the new regime (Heper 1974: 89).

The Great Depression of 1929 attacked the economic and political liberalism and created new opportunities for the new political authorities to be obtained and executed by the elite. Intellectual journal of the time, *Kadro*, defined the mission of the state as not only the accumulation of capital but also an avoidance of the class struggle. Conception of the state control and supervision in the economic life meant for the autocratic, bureaucratic and patrimonial Kemalist regime, a natural empowerment of the authority of the ruling elite. This vital mission could not be transferred to the private capital and villagers (Lewis 1991: 463-4).

During the period of *Estatism*, planned industrialization (first plan was implemented in 1933) resulted in rapid economic growth. Estatism and state economic enterprises (KİTs) started a process for an emergence of a new middle class, which were absent before, composed of businessmen, managers and technicians. This new middle class had a power in the future to change Turkey. The

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[20] In addition, one-party government was based on some objective conditions: "In Turkey, one-party system is the result of the incapability of the first legislative assembly which could not demonstrate a positive performance beyond discussions. On the other hand, the numbness of the popular masses could be compensated only with an insertion of a doctrine and by the implementation of other means to surpass the fatalism" (quoted in Heper 1974: 95).
[21] Nevertheless, the fact that the Kemalism was not formed as a doctrine and the idea of that Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi did not represent any class interest and the more importantly the reality of that the new regime did not have any radical intentions to transform the society completely did not lead the party to occupy a central place in the political life. This relatively weak position of the party in politics was also caused by the concentration of the political power into the central government during the İnönü period (Heper 1974: 114). Furthermore, in 1935 the prefects were also given the duty of the presidency for the local organizations of the party and the minister of the inferior affairs became the secretary general of the party (Heper 1974: 115).

State supported indirectly this social stratum by collecting its revenues mainly from the Salary and wage earners during the second war. By this, commerce and agricultural surplus lead to a sort of capital accumulation in the private hands. Later on the state wanted to share this accumulate wealth through *Varlık Vergisi* in 1942 (Tax of Wealth) but it immediately stooped the execution of law. At the end of the war, a new wealthy class emerged but confronted with the poor workers and villagers, and the government of the bureaucrats and military who had a control over the social and economic affairs during the war (Lewis 1991: 465-6).

Patrimonial and Rational Organization: The tradition of patrimonialism continued in the Republican era, too. Atatürk was successful in terms of defining social objectives, but he had no enough time to change radically old Ottoman administrative tradition. In appointments and selections, political criteria were far more decisive. Moreover, to make a radical change, there were no adequate personal and economic resources. After 1930s, revolutionary fever ended and hence old system of bureaucratic work came back (Heper 1977: 70).

This over-centralization was historically originated from the experience and requirement of early 1920s and near past when relatively local administration of financial affairs resulted in corruption. In addition, the role given to bureaucracy by Kemalizm raised the importance of centralist administration. Moreover, legislative and executive organs of the state saw the bureaucracy as a deflector as regards the policy goals. The question of control raised the formalism (Heper 1977: 76).

As for the merit system, patrimonial tradition was very influential as regards the empty positions, recruitment, selection processes and evaluation of exam results (Heper 1977: 76). In the upward mobilization in bureaucratic hierarchy, experience depended on year rather than merit was in the priority and inadequacy and incompatibility was never considered as a reason of job loses. Personnel qualifications, functions and positions are not explicitly defined. There are no "rational" relations between functions, personnel and Salaries. Classification attempts often degenerated (Heper 1977: 79-81).

Heper observed that foundation of the new bureaucratic authority was the political elite who represented the "center" since the entrepreneurial classes were politically weak (Heper 1977: 98) and more importantly, political program of the political elite did not originate from a social pressure of the "ruled"s. For this political elite rearrange the bureaucracy in its policy context. In this sense, that bureaucracy was considered as a tool for the application of Kemalist ideology could not produce so much "rationality as its bureaucratic development. The need to control old Ottoman bureaucracy contributed to this development, too (Heper 1977: 99).

On the other hand, Heper also suggests that a sort of "rational-productive" characteristics along the lines of patrimonialism and legal-rationality in the Ottoman-Turk bureaucratic development could be seen in the periods of ; emergence of financial and diplomatic questions during the 19.century; a rising interest on the

social and economic development within the context of "national economic policy" during the power of *İttihat ve Terakki*; experience of Estatism of the 1930s; planned period after 1960 (Heper 1977: 104). Responsibilities given to bureaucracy and adoption of French tradition of "grands ecoles" resulted in professionalism and specialization within the bureaucratic organization. The period of *İttihat ve Terakki* witnessed an attempt of planning and control mechanisms in order to create a Muslim bourgeoisie and reorganization of local administration together with local infrastructural development produces an educated and informed senior servants. Experience of *Estatism* of the 1930s created specialized bureaucrats having planning techniques. Administrators having a career of State Economic Enterprises were also wanted to be won by the private capital and moved toward the higher echelons of civil and military bureaucracy having a high prestige (Heper 1977: 105-6).

In the republican period, a law enacted in 1926, regularized the Salaries in a scale and defined the service requirements from personnel. Recruitment to the work was partly through examinations and partly through appointment. The authority of appointment was given to the superior ranks although in recruitment need of the office and personnel qualifications were not taken care so much. Salaries are regular but tend to decline and alternative job opportunities are limited in the country. Despite the weak position in the state organization the social position of the memur is very high in the society. People conceived the memur as a sort of master. The social status of the memur was not changed in a new regime. He was always an agent of the Sultan's authority. But he used his position like a father. The goodness as such made him bearable in the eyes of people. Concept of popular sovereignty in the new constitution could not radically change old attitude of the lower ranks in the state. This tendency increased with the decreasing economic power. The worst, new Western life style meant a new cost in the living conditions. The westernization attempts which began in Istanbul added to the ineffective attitudes of Turkish bureaucrat, cold preciseness of French *fonctionnaire* (Lewis 1991: 372).

Reformation of the state is much more important than to operate the state works efficiently for the new bureaucracy. The main aim was to ensure the survival of the state and the completion of the modernization, westernization, process. For this survival reason, priority was given to the establishment of the secular institutions. Moreover, reform issue is also a moral question (Heper 1974: 65).

The most significant success of the new regime was that it could able to put an end to the dual institutional structure, which had been originated from the objective conditions of the Tanzimat reforms, in favor of secularism. Besides legal and cultural reforms, all religious bureaucracy was civilized, and all religious norms were replaced by the principles of "nationalism, popularizm and democracy" (Heper 1974: 92-3).

Bureaucratization of the Government: Heper argues that "the golden age of the bureaucratic ruling tradition" is the years between 1923 (proclamation of the

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Republic and election of Atatürk as the head of the Republic) and 1950 (power seized by the opposition party, *Democrat Party*). In this republican era, Islamic tradition had no longer an influence as a criterion for political decision making. The tools for this final conquest of the secularism were education and law. Yet, for this reason these tools, in fact, meant a lack of emphasis upon the social and economic sphere. The priority of the republican regime was to create a cadre to elevate the country to the levels of west (Heper 1974: 89).

During the time of İnönü, for the political superiority of the civil bureaucracy to be increased it is rendered a career and the arbitrary interference of the political power to the internal bureaucratic organization was wanted to be prevented. The bureaucracy had the right for the unjust interventions to apply the court of the state, *Danıştay*, which was already composed of the bureaucrats. The bureaucracy is a closed stratum through its seniority structure and the training and education background. In the appointments for the middle and higher positions, an experience in the organization was a privilege. On the other hand, Salaries are high in addition to the other benefits in kind during the second war. Nevertheless, the bureaucratic ruling tradition would be to dissolve in this highest point of its golden age (Heper 1974: 115-16).

At the end of the 1930s, it is hard to distinguish the higher echelons of bureaucracy and the political elite. In this sense, Heper states that in the Turkish political terminology, "bureaucratic elite" is used to define these undifferentiated groups (Heper 1974: 111). For İnönü, political commitments were more important than the merit criteria in the civil service. The integrated condition of the bureaucratic and political elite was seen as a closed clique having the support of a group of businessman and the local notables and merchants (Heper 1974: 110).

Political Competitive Era: Transition to the multi-party system and later on the success of an opposition party, Democrat Party, in the 1950 elections changed the power center of the country from the office of the head of republic to the parliament (Lewis 1991: 368).

The new class wanted to change political and economic system in contrast to the Christian middle classes in the empire, who had not played any significant political and social role because of the ottoman social system and for this reason absorbed the Western influences within itself. The new class was not yet represented within the state and its rising power coincided with the decreasing prestige and status of the bureaucratic elite and other memur groups (Lewis 1991: 467).[22]

Apart from the changes in the part of middle classes, class based politics was released with the amendment in the Law of Associations in 1946 after the establishment of Ministry of Working in 1945. Lewis observed that these changes were an expression of post war economic and political liberalism. In 1947, a new law of syndicate for

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[22] In 1943, in the composition of parliament with 453 members, the number of the state servants was 127, soldier 67, 89 lawyer, 59 teacher were existed besides 49 merchant, 45 farmer, 15 banker and 3 industrialist (Lewis 1991: 467)

employees and employers was accepted. In 1952, number of the syndicates was 239 and a federation of syndicate had a member of 150 thousands (Lewis 1991: 471)[23].

The political elite who came to power with the 1950 elections rejected bureaucratic tradition and opposed the Kemalist revolutions of the previous period. But, it did not have an ideological and intellectual leadership alternative to Kemalizm and its bureaucracy (Heper 1974: 128-9). The worst was that there was no any liberal and entrepreneurial middle class which could weight its power over political life. The fact they preferred the foreign capital and sought to take foreign debt is seen by Heper as a "new traditionalist policy" (Heper 1974: 130). On basing such a background, the new political elite wanted to maintain the existing social and economic system and by this the old bureaucratic elite preserved its position and could continue the bureaucratic tradition of the state (Heper 1974: 131).

Nevertheless, rational characteristic of the bureaucracy was developing as regards the merit system and professionalism. Heper presents a historical study made by Kalkandelen for the years between 1923 and 1940. Professionals are required to graduate from related schools, Salaries are linked to the social statuses and functions, open announces and examinations are rendered essential in the recruitment. After World War II, foreign specialists and consultants are invited to Turkey for a study of rational arrangement of bureaucratic system. Establishment of *Turkey and Middle East Institute of Public Administration* (TODAİE) in 1953, inspired by the French model of "National Administrative School", a rising interest on the personnel administration, and finally, concerns for the structural problems of bureaucracy during planned period after 1961 all signaled a care of rational organization of bureaucracy (Heper 1977: 99-100).

However, such an interest on rational bureaucracy did not stemmed from social pressures but from political questions. The main aim is to eliminate the political activities and influences of bureaucracy (Heper 1977: 100) and to ensure the objectivity and neutrality of the bureaucracy. Even after the 1950s and 1960s, new social groups who came into the political power, did not bring into a perspective of efficiency and effectiveness for bureaucracy. Instead, political approach to the question continued. The reformation attempts, that emerge from time to time, concentrated on the wage and Salary question in the final analysis (Heper 1977: 101-2).

Continuation of patrimonialism was seen not only in Atatürk and İnönü but also in Menders' government. Heterogeneous character of posts, positions, appointments and promotions, difficulties of bureaucratic control implied the personal administration of

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[23] Within several years after the war, thousands of tractors were inserted into the rural areas and at large degree change the villagers and agricultural structure. Rural areas began to participate in country affairs. New urban services went to the villages. This was "second silent revolution" since Kemalist period took the revolution to the urban areas and urban populations and could not diffuse into the rural Turkey in main (Lewis 1991: 472).

patrimonialism. Bureaucratic centralism is related with this sort of personality. An ambiguity in the definitions of authority and responsibility, an anarchy in legal documents, distrust towards rank and file, a lack of self-initiative all result in the importance of the higher echelons. The question of control lead into detail of rules, which, in turn, result in formalistic application of rules (Heper 1977: 74-6).

The Democrat Party attempted either to decrease the prestige of bureaucracy or if possible tried to surpass bureaucratic procedures. It issued certain laws to be able to get out certain politically active bureaucrat from the service and tried to prevent the political activities in the universities. Nonetheless civil bureaucracy continued its political activity and saw itself as the competent power of political government (Heper 1974: 136-8)[24].

Opposition: Opposition and reaction to the political oligarchy represented by the *Democrat Party* in power of the 1950s comes from the bureaucracy and the newly emerged intellectual groups in the university, theoretically from the circle of a political journal, *Forum*. The reaction was based on the state conception of the early republic and the 1930s (Heper 1974: 131). The Opposition claims that politic should be based on the ideas and the reason which could be understood and devised in the direction of the public interest only by bureaucratic elite outside and the above the political life since there was certain requirements and the logic of the state service (*hizmetin icapları*). The logic of the public service could be known by the trained bureaucracy was arranged within the rules of the legal framework. As quoted in Heper, the conception of the state service as such was borrowed from the French law and interpreted in the meaning of that civil bureaucracy was essential in the policy making and the policy implementation process. It was also a result of the bureaucratic attitude which saw itself superior over the political elite (Heper 1974: 134-5).

Reform Attempts: Real beginning of administrative reforms begins after 1960s. Reforming criteria were studied in *Research Project of Central Governmental Organizations* (MEHTAP); researches for State Economic Enterprises, establishment of *State Planning Organization* (DPT) and State Personnel Office and completion of this organization on personnel reform studies and its submission to the government; establishment of *Turkey and Middle East Institute of Public Administration* (TODAIE) in 1953 for the purpose of personnel training and research. Nevertheless, all these attempts can not be counted as successful since the administrative question were not handled as a whole and internal structures of the administrative units were not taken for granted (Heper 1977: 71)[25].

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[24] It is indeed, as quoted in Heper, "civil bureaucracy is the ruling elite and a social class. Even though it is economically weak, it is politically effective and highly prestigious. It separates from the people. It is strictly Kemalist and secular and it wants to control the economy very closely. It carries a responsibility on behalf of the interest of the people, however, since its attitude is in the form of "state father" or so called as the "paternalist", it is remote from the capability of defining and meeting the actual needs of the masses" (1974: 139).

[25] Unproductive results of reform attempts are caused by the indifference of political authority and inadequacy of entrepreneurial classes to change the bureaucracy in the direction of their needs.

Rising importance of rationality dimension within the bureaucratic institutionalization came into the agenda with the empowerment of industrial capitalism during 1970s. These groups needed rationally organized infrastructural investments and for this reason they took attention to the ration bureaucracy (Heper 1977: 101). Nonetheless, in the administrative practice of Turkey, bureaucratic elements dominated over the rational characteristic of bureaucratic system since the administrative processes were not approached from the sociological perspective[26].

At this bureaucratic mobilization, long education before the bureaucratic career actually justified overemphasis given by Kemalists to education and specialization. Nonetheless, Heper observes that priority given by the regime to the higher education could not prevent the education to be "imitative, normative and ideological" (Heper 1977: 107). In the mid 1970s, that almost all senior administrators had a university degree exposed that the education was important criteria in the merit system. Nevertheless, rational-productive characteristics in the bureaucratic organization newly emerged (Heper 1977: 109-10). For Heper, Turk public bureaucracy is a patrimonial institution in which legalism is strictly applied despite its formalism in practice. In this sense, he calls it "legal-patrimonial" in the context of Weberian terminology. Bureaucracy is erected upon a comprehensive legal structure but rules are operated in "a patrimonial spirit" (Heper, 1977; 145-6)

The inadequacy of rationality is also seen in the ignorance of the planning and coordination units and other logistic units within the administrative structures. Even State Economic Enterprises have not enough autonomy (Heper 1977: 104).

Pendulum System: Heady states that "Modern Turkey is the product of modernizing military leadership which surrendered power to civilian hands but has stood nearby to intervene as necessary" (quoted in 1991; 353)[27]. It is indeed a part

Bureaucracy was required to materialize Kemalist principles in the one party period (1923-1950) and in the multi-part period (Heper 1977: 72), it confronted certain social interests and their political representatives (Heper 1977: 73), who could not develop alternative world view to its. Political elite of Democrat Party saw its movement only an agent to seize the power (Heper 1977: 73-4). 1961 Constitution consolidated the autonomy and the state philosophy of bureaucracy. Indeed, bureaucracy challenged the elected elite and this tendency would increase with 1971 military intervention (Heper 1977: 73). Ideological incapability of the new middle class was accompanied with the attempts of "state capitalism" of bureaucratic elite. Entrepreneurs won the political power but without any alternative world view to bureaucratic world view (Heper 1977: 74).

[26] The question was understood mainly as regards the legal procedures. However, inter-personnel and inter-group conflicts within the bureaucracy and technical administrative units put into the agenda later on. Mainly legal approach to the administration and unrealistic attitudes of senior servants were reported during the establishment of Turkey and Middle East Institute of Public Administration in the early 1950s (Heper 1977: 102). For this reason, even in the later decades, it is claimed that Turkish bureaucracy is not an agent of change, but tend to continue the existing situation in the context of legal procedures. This formalism, rather than creativity, is related with the autocratic sort of operation of the bureaucracy. Senior servants take initiative only by external will, otherwise, prefer to stand in a passive mood (Heper 1977: 103).

[27] The 1876 Constitution lead into Abdulhamid's despotism and 1908 Revolution into triumviri of tree Pasha, Enver-Talat-Cemal. Personal despotism was replaced by a small group of ministers. Just

from the facts that both the pioneers of the 1908 Young Turk revolution, which put back the delayed constitution into motion and the founding fathers of the Republic in 1923 were mainly military cadres, against Democrat Party 27 May 1960 military intervention, which brought soon into the most democratic constitution of the country, military note in 12 March 1971 against the Justice Party government and finally recent military coup d' etat in 12 September 1980 once more time against the Justice Party, all prove Heady's quotation. After the interventions, military administration soon restored the civilian rule and prepared a constitution or an amendment. Furthermore, it always gives up its place again to a parliamentary competitive system (Heady 1991: 354). It is argued that

> "another swing of the political pendulum must be anticipated as distinctly possible, in view of Turkey's historical record" (Heady 1991: 355).

Here we must add to Heady that the latest swing of the pendulum occurred in 28 February 1998 against the religious-conservative Welfare Party. In what follows, as quoted in Heady that

> "Little on the Turkish political scene can rival the potential importance of the military establishment" and paradoxically defines that "Among developing countries with a substantial record of political competition, Turkey is unusual in the solid bureaucratic base upon which the present-day nation state could build" (Heady 1991: 355).

Heady also observes a very significant historical change in the power and the role of the civil and armed bureaucracy:

> "during the 1950s the strength of both the civil and military bureaucrats within the national elite diminished markedly. The military intervention of 1960 reasserted the claim of the armed forces for a primary political role in cases of necessity to maintain stability, a claim which was reaffirmed with greater emphasis in 1980 and continues to be made today. The civil bureaucracy, on the other hand, has never regained its former key importance, although higher civil servants still are members of the governing elite" (Heady 1991: 356).

The role of the military is only to maintain the stability rather than modernizing the country and only the highest echelons of the civil bureaucracy is counted as being

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like Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and his close partner İsmet (İnönü) in the Republican era, Cemal and Enver came from military. But all political institutions such as Constitution, elections, parliament, party politics and later on Republican form owe much to these soldiers in higher ranks. Celal Bayar, who was a civil man and had a banking career, takes the prime ministry from İsmet İnönü but in 1938 the latter became head of the republic after the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Nonetheless, it was murmured that the last word was said by the soldiers even in the 1938s. However despite this soldier influences in the republic, Lewis said that the new regime never became a military dictatorship. Mustafa Kemal and İsmet undressed their uniforms. In the constitution, military was linked to the civil political authority. With 1950 elections, a civil prime minister and head and republic came into power. The parliament became far more powerful compared to the years betwee1923-1950 when Atatürk and İnönü had personal influences and authority in the country politics and administration. The former behaved like sultan in the appointments and the latter increased this tendency (Lewis 1991: 367).

among the ruling elite. The military can try to maintain its power only for the requirements of the political stability of the system whereas the bureaucracy can articulate to the ruling elite only through its top servants. In contrast to this dissolution of the community of the bureaucratic elite with its political, military and civil cadres, before the era of 1950s, there had been

> " 'considerable community of social, educational, and occupational background among parliamentary deputies and cabinet ministers on the one hand and the upper levels of the civil bureaucracy on the other' with a sort of closed corporation composed of 'professional public servants who, acting as politicians, passed laws which they and their colleagues administered as bureaucrats' " (Heady 1991: 356).

It seems that till the 1950s there was not but only formal divisions between political and administrative roles, between legislation and execution powers of the state in terms of the agency relations and between the training and education backgrounds of the members of the ruling elite. Such a ruling community began to destruct after the 1960s; but in this case, there emerges three wings of bureaucracy, in the form of civil, military and the political elite. Furthermore, civil bureaucracy loses its community character and its top servants only could participate into the ruling politics whereas the military is rendered only an emergency force to ensure the survival of the political structure.

Comparison of two cases

Models and Analogies in Public Administration: In the study of administration, Waldo (1967) sums up model choices in the development of the administration discipline. Different analogies, perspectives and accordingly different comparisons have been made as regards the models preferred by the researchers. These are in turn, *law*- administration is a legal system and works with and through a legal system, *machine*- administrative system is conceived as a machine which operates efficiently without friction and power loss, *organ*- organization lives within an environment and conceived within its ecology , *business*- public administration does not differ from the logic of business administration , *military* -military administration is a good model to understand public administration, *religion* - Catholic church provides for a administrative efficiency, *ideologies* -administrative neutrality is relative to its middle class milieu, *politics*- administration is conceived as a politics and classical dichotomy between politics and administration is rejected, *economics*- administrative system is viewed as a sort of economy, sociology-administration is a social system, social psychology, art- administration is a n art, *science*- administrative theory and practice should depend on the scientific criteria, *ethics*- moral choices rather than efficiency criteria are emphasizes in the administrative process, *communication*-communication systems of organization, semantic problems and tools of communication are studied, *creative mind*- organizations of civil service should be adjusted in favor of creative thinking, *systems*- Concepts such as homeostasis, input-output system, boundary-

maintaining system, feed-back mechanisms, of systems theory, *medical method*-focus is on the normal and healthy individuals (Waldo 1967: 49-59). In the face of plenty of alternatives, Waldo suggests that each model has an advantage over others and each one can be used as a window to see the certain aspects of the administrative phenomena (1967, 60).

If we accept this sort of instrumentalism offered by Waldo above, we will confront with far more problems when the question is to compare administrative systems and behaviors in different times (histories, periods) and different spaces (countries, organizations or systems in general). For a search of model to make comparison between administration systems, two ones will be handled in this article. The one is "ecological approach" or "prismatic theory of society developed by Riggs (1964, 1967) and the second one is Heady's focus on structures and functions of public bureaucracies of nation-states for comparative public administration (1967, 1991).

Bureaucracy as a Focus of Comparison: Heady explains his choice of bureaucracy as such:

> "the bureaucracy as a specialized political structure offers a better basis for treatment than would a choice of one or more functional categories. Our objective is comparison of public administration across polities, not the comparison of whole political systems. Such a narrowing of interest forces us to choose the most promising basis for comparison for the particular purpose (in this case public administration)-a basis that will simultaneously include enough, but not too much, and can promise data for comparison in the polities covered. For the student of public administration, the structure of bureaucracy has some advantages over the function of rule application, or any functional alternative..." (1991; 66).

It is sure that the choice of public bureaucracy as the means of comparison also requires a body of theory of bureaucracy. Heady presents three dominant tendencies to define bureaucracy. The term is first used in France in the eighteenth century by the minister of commerce in the meaning of "government in operation" and transmitted to Germany during nineteenth century and then spread to other places. The first scholarly investigation comes from Max Weber in Germany (1864-1920) (1991: 68). An ambiguity in the definition of bureaucracy originates from Weber's own formulation but, nonetheless, three sorts of definition are as follows:

1. Bureaucracy is an organization having basic structural characteristics in which organization is "composed of a highly elaborated hierarchy of authority superimposed upon a highly elaborated division of labor" (1991: 69).

2. Bureaucracy has certain behavioral characteristics, added to structural characteristic, resulting in bureaucratic behavior. The behaviors are not always functional and rational but also may be dysfunctional and irrational (1991: 69-71).

3. Bureaucracy, as Suggested by Peter Blau, is "an organization that maximizes efficiency in administration or an institutionalized method of organized social conduct in the interests of administrative efficiency". This perspective accepts

that both structural and behavioral aspects vary as regards purposes and Heady observes that "considerable agreement exists as to the basic organizational characteristics of bureaucracy, but there is much less certainty as to the behavioral traits associated with it (1991: 71).

Heady accepts the validity of bureaucratic theory developed by the West and criticizes Morroe Berger's objections which argue that western bureaucratic theory is not sufficient for the analysis of both West and non-Western bureaucracies. This was a confusion caused by the little attention given to the structural aspect of bureaucratic theory and resulted from the assumption that "a model of bureaucracy would combine structural and behavioral features". For Heady, Berger would fuse "traits generally considered pathological or dysfunctional with others usually viewed as functional or desirable, in constructing research tools for measuring 'typical' or 'Western' bureaucratic behavior" (1991: 72). Indeed, Berger, in his research on Egyptian bureaucracy in the context of Weberian formulas, legal-rational bureaucracy, found out that bureaucrats who were mostly influenced by West did not demonstrate in the questionnaire, Western norms of bureaucratic behavior. Berger concluded in his *Bureaucracy East and West* (1967: 384-5) that:

"When we try to compare bureaucratic and professional dispositions in the East and the West, we find that there may be differences of attitude and behavior in spite of the similarity in structure. As in other realms, similarity of structure and form, often the result of cultural diffusion, does not mean similarity of institutional or behavioral patterns".

And he gave his definition at the beginning, saying that:

"Bureaucracy has been analyzed from two related sides. Studies of bureaucratic structures have examined the centralization of power and authority, the establishment of a hierarchy of offices with special requirements and prerogatives, and the existing rules governing the exercise of function and authority. Studies of bureaucratic behavior, on the other hand, have examined the institutional or behavioral concomitants of these structures, such as caution in interpreting rules, self-interest among the corps of officials, their conduct toward the public, and (more recently) their informal relationships within the prescribed system".

"The concepts and findings of these studies have, of course, been developed by Western Scholars upon the basis of Western institutions. Their use as guides in the study of a bureaucracy in another culture-the civil service of Egypt today-points to their limitation for the analysis of bureaucratic behavior both in this non-Western setting and in our own society as well" (1967; 373).

It should be noted that similar structures does not result in same behaviors as regards Western theory and Eastern practice, but also, the existing structure does not have to correspond to the supposed behaviors as regards the Westerns theory and Western practice. For this reason, Berger has doubts for the validity of the traditional western theory of bureaucracy even in the West.

For Heady, bureaucracy is a form of organization and has basic structural characteristics (1991: 72), but this does not imply that "bureaucracies are identical as far as structure is concerned" (Heady 1967: 399).[28]

The Modes of Organizational Rationalization: Silberman mentions the "scalar fallacy" (1993: 9) in the implementation of the Weberian ideal types of traditional, charismatic and rational bureaucratic authorities in understanding the "variations in the organizational rationality" between the country experiences. By this, rational and traditional types are tried to be observed. However, serious categorization problems emerges due to "the scalar fallacy" in an understanding of the organizational development, the relationships between the division of labor in the society and the development of bureaucratic rationality, and more importantly the bureaucratic structures and the roles. Simply put, scalar fallacy prevents to see "why a seemingly universal process results in...different forms" (1993: 6) since Weber's own observations assumed that

> "there was a convergence toward uniformity of organizational characteristics" and legal and rational bureaucratic structure "seemed everywhere to be organized around the transformation of the administrative *role*, in turn, produced structural change"(1993: 4).

However, Silberman suggests that

> "The problem of categorization can be resolved to a large extent if we view the Weberian characteristics not as a series of scalar indices of structure but rather as a description or definition of role characteristics. The question then is no longer whether an administrative structure is more or less rational but whether an essential constellation of role characteristic is present. This allows us to ask whether or not there are different ways of arriving at this constellation of role characteristics described as 'rational' " (1993; 10).

Silberman in the face of "particular historical forms" in terms of the organization of bureaucratic roles suggests that "at least two varieties of role systems govern the form and structure of the rationalized administrative organization" (1993; 10)[29].

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[28] And structural focus on the bureaucracy as a definition "allows us to consider all patterns of behavior that are actually found in bureaucracies equally deserving to be called bureaucratic behavior". While structural focus is used to define bureaucracy, Heady says that "behavioral traits, more the structural elements, are what distinguish one bureaucracy from another" (1991; 73). However, only after "certain essential characteristics that are already generally accepted and understood, without attaching the label of 'bureaucratic' to any particular pattern or combination of behavioral traits", it is possible "to classify bureaucracies by behavioral patterns...without having to decide which behavior is more bureaucratic" (Heady 1967: 399).
[29] The one is "organizational orientation" (10-2) and the other "professional orientation" (1993: 12-5). The former pattern is "characterized by the presence of rules governing the criteria for higher offices that stress entry into the organizational career prior to appointment to office" (1993: 10). The latter pattern is "characterized by the rule that professional or professional training (not necessarily directly related to assuming bureaucratic role) is the primary criterion for holding higher administrative office" (1993: 12). When the former pattern well fit the examples of France, Germany and Japan, for instance, the latter is the model for Angle- Saxon tradition of rational organization of the bureaucratic authority (1993: 15).The organizational orientation is a good strategy of bureaucratic rational

Pendulum System: "Bureaucratic-Prominent Regimes": Heady defined the "political regime variations in developing countries" within two categories: "bureaucratic-prominent regimes" and "party-prominent regimes". The former category encompasses "traditional elite regimes" (e.g. Saudi Arabia and Iran), "personalist bureaucratic elite regimes" (e.g. Uganda 1971-79 and Guatemala pre-1944), "collegial bureaucratic elite regimes" (e.g. South Korea and Thailand and Ghana) and finally "pendulum regimes" (e.g. Brazil, Nigeria and Turkey) (1991; 312-68, and 289-96). The common administrative pattern is that "Usually an effective bureaucracy is coupled with vigorous modernizing elite as a prerequisite for progress" (Heady 1991: 296). And as for the meaning of the pendulum system in the general category of the bureaucratic-prominent regimes, it is stated that

> "the most significant feature of the political environment in some Third World countries may be that a pattern has been established swinging the political system periodically back and forth between bureaucratic elite and polyarchal competitive regime categories. Whatever the current situation, the pendulum is likely to swing again in the other direction in the near future. Because of the actual or potential power position of the bureaucracy, these needs to be viewed as bureaucratic-prominent regimes" (Heady 1991: 344).

The 'Sala' Model and the Prismatic Society: Heady suggests "bureaucracy" as a tool of comparison for the public administration of different polities. However, a model developed by Fred Riggs presents an ecological approach to the development administrative systems. He does not select a proper tool for comparison but develops a model for the study of public administration of transitional societies, which he call "prismatic society" (1964). The prismatic model reveals the "administrative ecology", which coexists with a distinctive economic ecology, elite stratification, social structures, symbols and power all peculiar to the prismatic society. "The bazaar-canteen" rather than market operating as regards price determination is the economic ecology. Prismatic elites refers to a prismatic stratification, which "appears to be chaotic and continually changing system of overlapping communities and strata, based on contradictory norms, which may be called *kaleidoscopic stratification*" (Riggs 1967: 124). Social structures are defined as "poly-communal" and symbols in prismatic society are poly-normative. Prismatic power gives an overemphasis on bureaucratic power (Riggs 1967). "Prismatic public administration" is called by Riggs as "the Sala model"[30].

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development in the "high uncertainty" while the professional direction fits well as a strategy for the low uncertain political environment (Silberman 1993).

[30] Riggs said that: "Hitherto the models upon which we have relied in political science and public administration are predominantly those derived from the study of America, Britain, and other Western countries. Because of the relative uniformity of environmental factors in all these countries, it is possible to study administrative institutions and practices as though they had an autonomous existence, apart from their environment and setting. Yet the 'ecology' of public administration is as much a limiting factor as in the ecology of biological species or cities. When administration in non-Western countries is studied with the help of our non-ecological models with their implicit assumptions of institutional autonomy, or when generalizations taken from these models are applied to situations in the 'underdeveloped' countries, they tend to crumble away. Hence I suggest that we

By putting the question, Riggs seems to explain the problems as regards the ecology of administration rather than the present theories in the time as in the case of Morroe Berger (1967). But, inserting ecological question to the problems of comparison, does not omit the existing theories but instead suggests an alternative model for the existing theories to be meaningful.

For Riggs, with a look for a mixture of traditional and modern institutions in the prismatic society, distinctive administrative features of the prismatic society can not be revealed. Rather, there is a new and distinctive feature different from traditional and modern structures. But this does not ignore that Sala as an administrative sub-model in the prismatic society can exist with modern "bureau" and traditional "court". Apart from this heterogeneity in the prismatic society, Sala demonstrates "a high degree of formalism", which refers to a "degree of discrepancy or congruence between the formally prescribed and the effectively practices, between norms and realities" (Riggs 1967: 415)[31].

Another feature of prismatic model creates for the Sala an overlapping of "formally differentiated structures of a refracted type" and "undifferentiated structures of a fused type". For example, new structures of government offices, parliaments, elections, schools, et cetera, coexist with the traditional family, religious structures. "This overlapping implies a social schizophrenia of contradictory formal (conscious) and informal (unconscious) behavior patterns". Riggs observes that both fused and refracted models do not know this sort of "substantial overlapping" (Riggs 1967: 417). Despite its transitional tendency, prismatic society is distinctive sort of society which is neither fused nor refracted.

In Sala, nepotism prevails; familial relations influence the recruitment, contracts, law enforcement, controls, permits, levying taxes. In Sala, "patrimonialism is officially proscribed but actually practiced" (Riggs 1967: 418). The administrative functions previously performed under the sponsorship of family and tribal relationships are performed in the clandestine form (Riggs 1967: 417-8).

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need to construct alternative, ecologically based models to help us in the study of administration abroad" (1967: 413).

[31] Riggs takes attention that "formalism" can be found out also in the most developed polities, for example USA wherein local government express a quite prismatic characteristics but nonetheless formalism is the "distinguishing mark of the prismatic system". What leads to formalism is "the lack of pressure toward program objectives, the weakness of social power as a guide to bureaucratic performance, and hence great permissiveness for arbitrary administration". Formalism "opens the door to corruption" and an attempt to reform the administration through the adoption of new law, a reorganization, redefinition of duties and positions will not result in effective behavioral change. On the other hand, in a refracted model (resembling modern society), a change of law takes its counterpart in the behavior since there is "a high degree of realism prevails" (Riggs 1967: 416).

Riggs states that in a prismatic society we have high degree of social mobilization but without a full assimilation to the elite. Mobilization without complete assimilation results in several hostile communities side by side (Riggs 1967: 421)[32].

Economic sub-model of the prismatic society is called "bazaar-canteen" which operates in "price indeterminacy" result of traditional "reciprocal" and "redistributive" institutions[33].

Normative aspects of the prismatic society is "poly-normativism", which is caused by the fact that new norms, formulas and myths obtained from more refracted society are superimposed in the old ones. This situation leads into a "lack of consensus" (Riggs 1967: 424) and even normlessness[34].

As regards the power distribution and some *clichés* in the immediate observation of the so called "underdeveloped" countries, such as over-centralization of the authority, Riggs rightly puts forward the "whole discussion of corruption, nepotism, poly-normativism, clect influence, etc.," which all "suggests that

[32] Riggs prefers to call this situation "poly-communal" rather than "plural society". The tendency in the Sala, officials favor for recruitment dominant community members. If different community members work in the same office, obstacles to communication emerge. Riggs says that this poly-communal situation is found in American local governments of the South in the form of minority community discrimination (1967: 419). Poly-communal situation result in community chambers, federations. In the Sala, recruitment and public policy tend to orient towards dominant communities. These communities are different from "interest groups" in the refracted society. Associations as such are called by Riggs, *clects*, which is "an organization with relatively diffuse functions of a semi-traditional type, but organized in a modern, associational way". Illegal revolutionary political parties are clects, as Riggs defines, which offer an alternative solidarity for their members. As regards Sala, a certain clects may control the government offices and there emerges an "unofficial orientation toward the dominant clect, despite an official mandate to serve the general public interest" (Riggs 1967; 420). Interests of "in-groups" disregard those of "out-groups" shape the Sala-clect connection by avoiding general public interest. The significant is that "clect formation within the Sala contradicts the achievement and universalistic norms, typical of a refracted government bureau or office". Again an overlapping as such nullifies the formal norms of the Sala (Riggs 1967: 421).

[33] In the refracted model, financial consideration of administrative behavior take cares the costs and egalitarian assumptions. Salaries are arranged by the cost of labor required for the job. In Sala, this cost criteria does not work in practice but accepted formally. We have official and unofficial prices for services, rates, percentages, purchases and contracts. In Sala, income and cost of living diverge and for this reason, there is an "institutionalized" corruption (Riggs 1967: 422-3).

[34] An official of the Sala may formally accept a norm while secretly rejecting it. In one moment, a regulation may be rigidly enforced whereas in other moment it is completely ignored. In Sala, contract based relationship may be a sort of status privileges. "Rationalistic" procedures in the Sala, which means borrowing of administrative techniques from refracted model without understanding how to help itself, result in "copying" or "imitation". The foreign technical devises are often irrelevant to the existing situations (Riggs 1967: 425-6). The citizens in their dealing with Sala behaves rather opportunist and try to take advantage of "breaking the law", otherwise demands a strict application of the rules as regards the interests they have. "Ultimately, the public is cynical about law and administration". In this system, "objectivity and truth as criteria of information tend to dissolve and the victim is left with no option" (Riggs 1967: 427).

effective power is widely dispersed in the Sala model" (Riggs 1967: 427). Riggs states that in the fused and refracted models, power encompasses both authority and control. In contrast, prismatic power structure offers a separation of authority and control. Centralization of authority goes hand by a dispersed structure of authority. Formalism, normlessness, prismatic community structure makes the authority of center rather formalistic (Riggs 1967: 428).

In the context of refracted instrumentalism which separates the administrative power as a realm of execution of policies from political as the area of policy formulation and definition, Riggs argues that:

> "In the Sala, the official continues to exercise the undifferentiated political-administrative functions of the fused model, but behind a facade of administrative institutionalism borrowed from industrial, relatively refracted societies. Hence he can scarcely admit to the public, or even to himself, that much of his actual behavior is essentially political, involving a struggle for power and participation in the making of whatever decisions are made for the society. The Western-trained observer who tires to identify the locus of decision-making in such a system comes away baffled, convinced that decisions are made surreptitiously, conspiratorially, clandestinely" (1967: 429).

The Sala bureaucrat is required to control but often without authority delegated by his superiors and he is not formally supposed to make decisions in the existing legal system (Riggs 1967: 429-30)[35].

What is the merit of Sala model is that it applies not only to the distinctively prismatic society but also prismatic characteristics of the more developed societies. In this sense, prismatic model actually is a beginning in order to surpass the stagism of modernization theories which accepts a linear movement from the pre-modern to proto-modern and finally to the advanced modernity. Moreover, structure-behavior dichotomy, as exemplified by the Morroe's objections on the Weberian legal-rational authority and responses made by Heady (see above), seems to be a sort of solution. He does not try to reveal presupposed attitudes in the similar structures. Riggs observes the structures as regards behaviors and vice versa. Riggs states that "a model, like that of the Sala, is not intended to serve as a description of any particular society or system of government. Rather, it serves a heuristic purpose". "One consequence of this exercise might be to enable students of American administration to recognize in a more systematic way the 'prismatic' elements of our own government" (Riggs 1967: 431).

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[35] He either takes the initiative and hence beaks the law or rejects his duties and does not show initiative. In the active behavior, official identifies himself "the instrument of people" by observing "their present lack of education and political sophistication" and "he will teach them, help them prepare to assume real political power" yet he accepts that he is at the last resort an instrument. Riggs suggests that if political power is great, officials have strong initiative to achieve the program goals because the successful ones are rewarded. When the political power is not strong, officials do not seek the achievement of the policy goals since the success is not awarded (1967: 430).

Concluding Remarks

A mere comparison for two or more phenomena focuses upon the similarities and differences of the facts and values. But, a far more developed act of comparison should account for the types of processes through which fact-value dichotomy and the structure-agency duality could be surpassed. By doing so, we substitute the *structuration*[36] for structures in a way that we could reveal the objectivity of the subjective contingency and vice versa.

French type of bureaucratic institutionalization follows the up-to down mode of development without modern political tools and without grounding on an industrial division of labor. This is the same reality for Ottoman Turk bureaucratic development. The new political regime tries to survive with its cadres and ideologies. In this process bureaucratic development emerges as a vital instrument of the political revolution. However, for the maintenance of its political survival, new political power, from a certain point of maturity, had to direct its attention to the question of economic development in order to complete the revolution in the exact meaning of the term.

In this process, bureaucratic authority develops as the main channel of the political power formation since for the political power to be itself; it should change into a state power. At this phase of the development, it is hard to distinguish the power and the authority in that bureaucratic and political roles in the state are fused. Such a fusion corresponds to the emergence of the state in a modern sense. So, the development of bureaucratic organizational rationality must follow the logic of the emerging state. If, for example, political power had been developed outside the existing state politics, it would not have needed a fusion of the power and authority within its own hand. But, there would be more or less clear division between political power and bureaucratic authority. Consequently, French and Turkish cases of rational bureaucratic development clearly demonstrate that there is, even at the early phase of development, not a theoretical necessity for a middle class background. Rather, maybe, it should not be existed at large degree if and when, as Silberman (1993) puts it, British mode of organizational rationalization, which is professional oriented, is concerned. This exposes even that there may be many "rationalization" modes for the bureaucratic organizations both in past and present. Consequently, to remind the questions raised by Heady (1967: 1991), Berger (1967), Silberman (1993), it cannot be assumed that there can be a *priori* rational universal correspondence between the structures and the behaviors for the bureaucratic organizations. The term rationality is rather contingent on the context of the bureaucracy. At this regard, by following what Silberman defines as "*scalar fallacy*" (*see above* 1993), the question of whether Turkish experience achieves the level of French bureaucratic organization, which is *rational*, *legal* and *efficient*, is a

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[36] Here the term *structuration* belongs to sociologist Anthony Giddens but I use it as formation process of objective relations.

chimera since the characteristic of legal-efficient rationality can be relatively and contingently defined but not absolutely.

The lack of relative and contingent understanding can be seen paradoxically in the Sala Model (Riggs 1964: 1967). Though the Sala supposes not only a mixture of traditional and developed models of bureaucratic organization but a distinctive type of bureaucratic phenomena, it implies that the prismatic society is a society which could not become a refracted society, accordingly, which is no longer a fused society, either. But the merit of the Sala model is that it refers to relativity in the logics of rationality. How can it be argued that the prismatic Sala is irrational? Nonetheless, it is possible to define the objective criteria for legality and efficiency. But this objectivity takes us to the area of law and economics where we cannot understand inherently political character of the bureaucratic organization in its rational and legal attributes.

The different ends, if we accept that the histories of the two developments had ended, can be understood only again by a direct reference to the political development. Turkey's pattern of change has not as much radical as the French political change, which is a plenty of subsequent ruptures. The difference can be seen at this point. The politics of "ruptures" leads the French political elite to have more and more dependent and stable bureaucratic structure for both the maintenance of his political power and his capability of holding the state power. As Marx said somewhere, the French politics is a politics in which all sort of contradictions and conflict clearly demonstrates themselves. This is the grounding difference between two modes of bureaucratic institutionalization and its ends.

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